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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

DONETTA 1. KAFADER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
KIMBERL Y A. BAUMANN,
Defendant-Respondent.
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)
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)
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Supreme Court
Docket No. 39195-2011

-----------------------------)

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District County of Twin Falls
The Honorable Randy J. Stoker District Judge Presiding

Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ID 83616

Michael E. Kelly
Lopez & Kelly, PLLC
413 West Idaho Street, Suite 100
P.O. Box 856
Boise, ID 83701

F or the Appellant

For the Respondent
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REPL Y ARGUMENT

1. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion.

The questions presented on appeal are simple; did Judge Stoker conduct an independent
evaluation and weigh all of the evidence, and then determine what the trial court would have
awarded as damages when deciding the motions for new trial; and ifhe did not, was there legal
authority for not so doing? The answer to the first question is a resounding "no." Judge Stoker
stated unequivocally that he had deferred to the jury and did not weigh the credibility or
testimony of the expert witnesses.
The answer to the second question is also "no." Neither Judge Stoker in his opinion, nor
the Respondent in her brief, cited to legal authority directing the trial court to afford deference to
the jury related to the evaluation of the credibility and testimony of expert witnesses, or any
evidence for that matter.
If the applicable standard, applying either Rule 59(a)(5) or 59(a)(6), requires the trial
judge to independently weigh all of the evidence, and the trial judge specifies that he is not
considering or weighing the testimony of any of the expert witnesses when deciding post-trial
motions, and further that he was deferring to what the trial court assumed the jury had concluded
regarding the testimony of the expert witnesses, then how has the trial court applied the requisite
standard when considering post-trial motions for additur and new trial? "Thus, to determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must assess whether it properly examined the
relationship between its own findings offact and the jury verdict through the unique lenses of
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Rule 59(a)(5) and 59(a)(6)." Carrillo v. Boise Tire Co., p. 12, Supreme Court Doc. No 37026
(2012). (Emphasis added.)
If the trial judge must determine what he would have awarded, based on his own
independent evaluation of the evidence, and the trial court acknowledges that he has not
considered the credibility or testimony ofthe medical expert witnesses, then how could the trial
court have determined what he believed was the proper amount of damages?
On appeal, if the reviewing court must "assess whether it [the trial court] properly
examined the relationship between its own findings of fact and the jury verdict through the
unique lenses of Rule 59(a)(5) and 59(a)(6), how can the reviewing court provide any
meaningful review if the trial court has not made the requisite "findings of fact" related to all of
the evidence?
By failing to follow the requisite standards; which require the trial court to conduct its
own independent evaluation of the evidence and to determine what it would have awarded in
damages, Judge Stoker abused his discretion when denying Mrs. Kafader's post-trial motions.

2. Dr. Hammond Conceded Nothing.
Mrs. Kafader will stand by her contention in her Appellant's Brief when she argued, " ... ,
the Defendant failed to provide a single medical record that established or corroborated either an
accurate diagnosis of fibromyalgia or any ongoing treatment for this "syndrome" at any point

relative to the 2008 collision as Dr, Knoebel claimed." Dr. Hammond did acknowledge he stated
in a single chart note he was prescribing medication for the "fibromyalgia aspect," or for "pain,"
but he ultimately determined, after having treated Mrs. Kafader for over two years and after

Appellant's Brief - 2

having conducted thirteen evaluations over that time period, Mrs. Kafader's cervical pain was
not caused by any alleged fibromyalgia syndrome, but by a muscle spasm that he and Dr. Turner
had observed and documented for over two years. (Tr., p 188, L. 18 to p. 189, L. 10.) Contrary
to the Respondent's contention, Dr. Hammond conceded nothing.
Imagine the situation where Dr. Knoebel was actually practicing medicine and was truly
trying to diagnose Mrs. Kafader's injuries, perhaps he would have contacted Dr. Hammond and
inquired about the single entry over the course of over two years, when that Dr. Hammond used
the word "fibromyalgia." Dr. Hammond's reply would have been commensurate with this
testimony; first, that had considered and subsequently ruled out fibromyalgia, and second, he did
use the word once, which he considered synonymous for pain. Ultimately, Dr. Hammond was
unequivocal in his testimony that he had ruled out fibromyalgia, and his and Dr. Turner's
documented observation of objective symptoms in Mrs. Kafader's neck corroborated that
conclusion.
The bottom line is Dr. Knoebel could have cared less what was in Dr. Hammond's
medical records as evidenced by his less than two-minute review during the end of his video
deposition required because Dr. Knoebel refused to attend the trial. Even Mrs. Baumann's
Counsel was surprised by Dr. Knoebel's cursory review and inquired whether Dr. Knoebel
needed more time. (Supp. Tr., p. 39, L. 6-22.)
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3. The Deference To Which The Jury Is Entitled Is Related Ultimately To Its Damage
Award, Not When Evaluating Any Evidence.
In Beale v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521, 903 P.2d 110 (Idaho App., 1995), the Court, citing to

Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 625, 603 P.2d 575, 580 (1979), discusses a trial court's duty
to "defer" to the jury's damage award, "unless it is apparently to the trial judge there is a great
disparity between the two damage awards and that disparity cannot be explained away as simply
the product of two separate entities valuing the proof of the plaintiff's injuries in two equally fair
ways." Beale v. Speck, 127 Idaho 521, 903 P.2d 110, 125-26 (Idaho App., 1995).
Contrary to the Respondent's contention, the "great disparity" standard only applies after
the trial judge has weighed all of the evidence, made its own independent assessment of all of the
evidence, and determined what the court would have awarded in damages. In this case, however,
the trial court stated it was deferring to the jury's evaluation of the medical testimony, not the
jury's resulting damage award. "The credibility of the doctors' opinions is truly a matter for jury
determination." (R., p. 339.)
Judge Stoker, although claiming he had "weighed the evidence in this case ... ", concludes
with the qualification, "given the finding that the cervical injury was not permanent." (R., p.
340.) As stated clearly and earlier in his decision, Judge Stoker was deferring to the jury when
evaluating the medical expert testimony, and as the issue of the permanency of Mrs. Kafader's
injury was addresses solely by the medical expert testimony, the only logical conclusion is Judge
Stoker did not independently determine whether Mrs. Kafader had sustained a permanent injury,
but was speculating as to what the jury may have determined viewing the evidence from the
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jury's perspective. While the Respondent argues Judge Stoker had weighed all of the evidence,
his stated and clear qualification; "given the finding that the cervical injury was not permanent,"
when considered with Judge Stoker's disclosure he was deferring to the jury regarding the
medical expert testimony, proves otherwise.
If the amount the trial court would have awarded, based on an independent evaluation of
all of the evidence, including the expert testimony, is different from what the jury awarded, then
the court must defer to the jury's finding unless tht::re is great disparity. However, that deference
applies only after the court has reached its own conciusion, having afforded no deference to the
jury related to the evaluation of any of the evidence.

4. Attorney Fees.
Rather than address and argue whether Judge Stoker's disclosure that he had not
independently evaluated the medical expert evidence was appropriate, the Respondent simply
ignores this fact. Consequently, if Judge Stoker was required to independently assess and
evaluate all of the evidence, including the expert testimony, to determine what the trial court
would have awarded, and then to compare those figures when deciding the post-trial motions; the
standard the Respondent does not dispute, then how is the Respondent's defense on appeal other
than anything but frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation in light of Judge Stoker's
disclosure he was deferring to the jury and had not independently evaluated the medical
testimony?
Once again, Mrs. Kafader seeks attorney fees on appeal according to Idaho Code § 12121. "Attorney fees under § 12-121 will be awarded to the prevailing party on appeal when this
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Court is left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." Adler v. Abolafia, p. 10, Supreme Court Doc.
No. 38189 (2010), quoting Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526,533,66 PJd 230,237 (2003).

CONCLUSION
As the record is clear that Judge Stoker did not independently evaluate the credibility or
testimony of the medical expert witnesses, and the legal standard is equally clear that a trial court
deciding the post-trial motions presented below is not authorized to defer to the jury when
independently evaluating all of the evidence, once again Mrs. Kafader respectfully requests that
the appellate court remand this case to the district court with direction the district court conduct
its own evaluation of the evidence and weigh the credibility of the medical expert witnesses
when deciding Mrs. Kafader's Motion for Additur and in the alternative New Trial.
As Mrs. Kafader believes there was no credible evidence to support any conclusion she
had not suffered a permanent cervical injury, Mrs. Kafader asks the appellate court, in the
alternative, to remand the case with direction to the district court to grant Mrs. Kafader's motion
for Additur or New Trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of June, 2012.
TES, ATTORNEYS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 19th day of June, 2012, I served the foregoing, by
having a true and complete copy delivered via hand delivery to:
Michael E. Kelly
LOPEZ & KELLY, PLLC
413 West Idaho Street, Suite 100
P.O. Box 856
Boise, ID 83701

_._---------------

Eric R. Clark
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